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INTERDEPENDENCE AND WTO LAW
by Chios Carmody1

1. Introduction
A volcano erupts in Iceland and flights across Europe are grounded, causing damage to supply and value
chains.2 A tsunami hits the coast of Japan and production lines across Asia and much of the rest of the world
grind to a halt.3
These two episodes - both very real and very devastating - illustrate the degree to which the modern global
economy, and by extension, the international community, have become a function of interdependence. As a
matter of economics interdependence sustains current living standards. Life cannot continue without it. One
former British Prime Minister has gone so far as to describe interdependence as “the defining characteristic of
the modern world.”4
In the midst of this ceaseless inter-relating and productivity has come the WTO Secretariat’s “Made in the
World Initiative” (MIWI). The Initiative, which was formally kicked-off in June 2011, highlights the way in
which the global economy has become so interconnected that politicians’ traditional preoccupation with trade
deficits may be irrelevant. The Initiative’s debut study, conducted by Japan’s Institute of Developing
Economies (IDE), reveals that global economic activity seriously overstates the “problem” of trade balances
because most advanced goods are composed of components from multiple sources, cross national boundaries
several times in the course of their production, and integrate additional elements like services, design and
intellectual property, so that it is no longer appropriate to refer to them as the product of any one country.
Instead, they should be designated as “Made in the World”.5 The IDE study infers that, at least for the moment,
the phenomena of interdependence is really an issue of statistical measurement, of numbers and empiricism,
rather than anything more.
At the same time, the WTO is not simply an organization devoted to the exchange of trade concessions and the
measurement of their interaction in quantitative terms. Over the last two decades it has developed an
impressive, and occasionally controversial, dispute settlement system that highlights the WTO Agreement as a
system of law. Examining this development it is possible to wonder what the role of law is in the
interdependence that MIWI emphasizes? Is interdependence purely a quantitative issue, or does it have
qualitative consequences?
What I suggest in this contribution is that law, including WTO law, traditionally has difficulty dealing with
interdependence due to the atomized way in which law is arranged. At the risk of some simplification, the
architecture of law can be understood as the assembly of rights and obligations. The phrase “rights and
obligations” is in fact well-known in WTO law.6 What I maintain in this article, however, is that a legal
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system’s stress upon “rights” and “obligations” obscures the natural way in which these two basic legal
elements interact and are, in their operation, themselves a manifestation of interdependence. Bearers of
individual rights and obligations need them to regulate their relationship, and a single “right” or “obligation”
will be sustained by many other supporting rights and obligations.7 These can be thought of coordinately as the
basic elements of a legal system.
So far, many analyses of WTO law have neglected this aspect of the law – interdependence – because the law
itself does not appear outwardly to conform to a model of interrelation. Much of the early experience with
WTO law has, in fact, been seen through the filter of WTO dispute settlement which appears, superficially at
least, to be concerned with singular, or clusters of, obligations, as in the EC – Bananas case, where the issue
revolved around the EC’s obligation to apply an MFN tariff, or more rarely, with the vindication of rights, as
in the EC – Tariff Preferences case, where the issue was the EC’s right to apply differential conditionality as a
test for a country’s access of certain trade-related benefits.8 Because of this artificial segregation, the fact that
legal rules are about interdependence may be easy to miss. Thus, WTO law may have more in common with
MIWI than is at first evident or is commonly supposed.
These points are important to understand and appreciate because the global economy is becoming
characterized by webs of cooperation that involve ever more proximate and intensive interdependence.
Evolutionary psychology suggests that this interdependence is becoming more pervasive so that we may not be
able to live without it. It is, in fact, so pervasive, that we take it for granted, from the orange juice on our tables
every morning to the music we listen to made from synthesized sound tracks involving hundreds of artists
around the world. Yet it is also changing the way we think - and that we must think - in an era of globalization.
This has implications for the shape of international law generally.
In 1964 Wolfgang Friedmann posited the view of international law as a “law of cooperation”.9 The ideas put
forward in this article regard the actual state of international law, at least in the realm of WTO law, as now
surpassing Friedmann’s conception. They infer that WTO law is developing along a much steeper trajectory of
collaboration and driven by a much more intensive degree of interaction than Friedmann foresaw, one that I
term a “law of interdependence”. In contrast with Friedmann’s conception, the law of interdependence goes
beyond a voluntary desire to cooperate and evidences an obligatory impulse to collaborate. Simply put,
countries can no longer isolate themselves from the global trading system without putting themselves at a
disadvantage. We have become the subjects of interdependence.
2. From Interface to Interdependence

obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.”). For instance, in Argentina – Footwear Safeguards, WT/DS121/R (25 June 1999), the panel stated that the
WTO Safeguards Agreement represented “a re-establishment of multilateral control” over safeguard action, something which “implies a new
balance of rights and obligations that in some cases modifies the whole package of rights and obligations resulting from the Uruguay Round
negotiations.” (Ibid., para. 8.58). Similarly, in discussing the scope of the ‘safe haven’ to WTO subsidies disciplines in Brazil – Aircraft,
WT/DS46/RW/2 (26 July 2001), the panel observed that existing arrangements “reflects a negotiated balance of rights and obligations, which is
not for a panel to upset.” (Ibid., note 86.) The panel went on to observe that “If the Participants were to abuse their power to modify the scope of
the safe haven, the recourse of other Members would be to renegotiate the second paragraph of item (k).” It added, ““It should be pointed out that
the various exceptions provided for in the WTO Agreement are an integral and important part of the carefully negotiated balance of rights and
obligations of Members.” And in discussing entitlement to invoke countermeasures in US – FSC, WT/DS108/ARB (30 Aug. 2002), the arbitrator
observed that “the entitlement to countermeasures is to be assessed in light of the legal status of the wrongful act and the manner in which the
breach of that obligation has upset the balance of rights and obligations as between Members.” (Ibid., para. 5.24).
7
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Interdependence arises in the mutual reliance of actors upon each other. It originates in our biology, something
that has been intuited by other theorists and commentators of international law. Thus, Emmerich de Vattel
observed in The Law of Nations (1758):
Such is man’s nature that he is not sufficient unto himself and necessarily stands in need of
the assistance and intercourse of his fellows, whether to preserve his life or to perfect himself
and live as befits a rational animal … From this source we deduce a natural society existing
among all men. The general law of the society is that each member should assist the others in
all their needs, as far as he can do so without neglecting his duties to himself – a law which
all men must obey if they are to live comformably to their nature and to the designs of their
common Creator; a law which our own welfare, our happiness, and our best interests should
render sacred to each of us. Such is the general obligation we are under of performing our
duties; let us fulfil them with care if we would work wisely for our greatest good.10
Interdependence, like many abstract ideas, is a difficult subject to address, both because it is so pervasive and
so fleeting. Interdependence exists as an independent phenomenon, and yet at the same time, it is woven into
the fabric of everything else. We have to think long and hard before accepting its primacy as an explanation for
the shape of the law.
Developments in communication, manufacturing, logistics and retailing over the last two decades have led to
the globalization of production.11 For this most part, production now takes place in immense, highly
sophisticated supply chains that span the globe and ensure the smooth flow of product from input suppliers to
the ultimate consumer. Participants must be nimble and broad-minded. The conceptual modifications required
are profound. Alan Waller has observed:
The difference in skill requirements in today’s highly competitive fast-changing world is that
we need to have visibility and control of our supply chain in order to compete. Manufacturers
need to think upstream about supply and be driven by the end customer. Retailers need to
satisfy their customers but need to think supply chain to achieve this. Wal-Mart sees their
core skill as being ‘A procurement agent for the consumer’, hence their focus on supply chain
management in all that they do.12
Other supply chain experts have pointed out that supply chain manufacturing requires participants to shift from
mere ‘interfacing’ to integrating their production. Supplier selection becomes supplier collaboration. Arm’s
length relationships are replaced by total commitment. Confrontational behaviour makes way for integrated
forms of cooperation. Short-term planning is exchanged for longer term thinking.13 In sum, a transactional
perspective is replaced by a relational one that emphasizes the linkage of the parties across time.14 Individual
components become part of a greater whole.
Inevitably, this configuration requires the removal of barriers so that the entirety of production, which can
involve many stages among a number of independent contractors, become a common enterprise. Stuart
10
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Emmett and Barry Crocker have observed:
In a world-class supply chain … barriers cannot remain. It cannot be that the flow of product,
information and finances between the links in the chain are allowed to be compromised by the
perception of company boundaries. Despite the fact that supply chains are made up of
different companies and that there may be both legal restriction and operational difficulties,
these must be overcome so that the supply chain is treated as a whole and is optimised as a
whole.15
In some cases, this degree of unity and integration creates something new that one dominant participant is
interested in holding on to because it aligns with a company’s core functions. The supply chain is something of
value that an enterprise is interested in preserving and exploiting over time. In other cases, the supply chain
may represent an expense or a threat for a participant and so the pattern of relationships is ended.16 In still
others, corporate reorganizations may spinoff part or all of the chain as one participant transitions to new
operations under different conditions. The supply chain, now reconfigured, will draw on pre-existing patterns
of relationships and behavioural memory to fulfill some new function.
Each of these possible supply chain outcomes depends upon the product in question, the actors involved, and a
host of other factors that impact upon a supply chain’s resilience and integrity. Like living organisms, supply
chains exhibit distinct identities. They evolve and are adaptive. Very few are completely alike.
They are also sensitive. The need for smooth interaction of many parts exposes supply chains to disruptions
and makes then vulnerable to external shocks and opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the requirement for a ‘unity’
of operation can both beneficial and detrimental.
The independent persona of the supply chain is, in addition, something that can have consequences in law. For
legal purposes the supply chain can assume certain attributes of personality, which is especially important to
those who are interested in differentiating their product from competitors. In environmental products, ‘fair’
trade and organic certification, for instance, the chain itself becomes the source of intellectual property, such as
in a designation of ‘traditional speciality guaranteed’, or trademark.17 Potential participants have to commit to
meeting certain requirements in order to become involved.
Experts have also noticed a recurrent feature of supply chains. This is the fact that as supply chains mature and
their outputs become subject to greater competition, power shifts to the ‘end’ of the supply chain.18 Consumers
and purchasers become more important, leading to a culture of “Just Say Yes”.19 Walmart, like many other
large retailers, routinely uses its enormous marketing clout to wrest continuous discounts from suppliers, a
tactic that promotes a “race to the bottom” as upstream suppliers perennially scout for the most cost-effective
source. In certain industries, this movement is offset to a degree by the desire to ensure quality control and
preserve supplier ties.
Legal analysis may be tempted to reduce the various interacting elements of a legal system to ‘rights’ and
‘obligations’, and indeed for the purposes of manageability often must do so. Nevertheless, the law’s natural
reductivism should not obscure the fact that what is being contemplated in any legal analysis is, in some sense,
the reflection a series of relationships embodying interdependence. Interdependence is characteristic of
virtually all human endeavour and is why individuals who come together in the form of communities must
15
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agree on the assignment of rights and obligations. There must be responsibility and there must be reciprocity,
even if that reciprocity is not always equal.
3. Interdependence in WTO Law
In this article I take the view that all law can, in one form or another, be understood as being about
interdependence. We often say that for there to be a right, there must be a corresponding obligation (i.e. right =
obligation).20 Yet the manifestation of this basic relationship is not immediately apparent. To maintain that law
– or international law – is ultimately about interdependence seems far-fetched, especially when looked at
through the frame of individual legal rules and disputes. How is it possible, for instance, to assert that a rule
concerning maritime delimitation or immunity or jus cogens are really about interdependence? At this level of
scrutiny the link with interdependence is hard to see.
Interdependence is likewise a difficult subject to identify in WTO law. The WTO Agreement never expressly
employs the term “interdependence” and WTO panels and the Appellate Body have only rarely referred to it.
Still, considered carefully, one can see that interdependence is a pervasive theme throughout the treaty. Several
descriptions offered by panels and the Appellate Body illustrate the material way in which interdependence
generated by trade concessions is transforming the global economy. For example, the panel in U.S. –
Underwear described the overseas extension of the U.S. textile and clothing industry during the early 1990s as
follows:
In the course of the last six years, there has been a significant change in the US cotton and
manmade fibre underwear manufacturing industry which has significantly switched from
producing and assembling underwear domestically to producing components in the United
States for assembly in other countries and subsequent return to the same enterprises in the
United States for marketing. This pattern of co-production has enabled the companies in this
industry to maintain their share of the US market by making use of the labour force available
outside the country while at the same time controlling the source of raw materials, the
production timetable, the types and amounts of underwear to be produced and the marketing
of the final product. Moreover, these co-production operations were consistent with the
policies of the United States, which was encouraging investment and production in Mexico
and the Caribbean Basin.21
Similarly, in Mexico – Telecoms the panel observed that:
…. basic telecommunications services supplied between Members do require, during the
delivery of the service, a high degree of interaction between each other's networks, since the
service typically involves a continuous, rapid and often two-way flow of intangible customer
and operator data. The interaction results in a seamless service between the originating and
terminating segments, which suggests that the service be considered as a single, cross-border
service.22
And in U.S. – Aircraft WTO decision-makers detailed the multinational list of suppliers involved in
manufacturing the Boeing 787 Dreamliner:
Completion of sub-assemblies and integration of systems takes place in Everett, Washington,
with many components being pre-installed before delivery to Everett. The 787 composite
Wesley Hohfeld pointed out that the terms “rights” and “obligations” encompass a much wider array of legal relationships than their normal
appellation might suggest. One of Hohfeld’s most important contributions to the study of jurisprudence was to maintain that there are at least four
correlative relationships in law: rights and obligations, privileges and no rights, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities. For an outline
of these ideas see Wesley Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917). Yale Faculty Scholarship Series,
Paper 4378.
21
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22
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20
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wings are being manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The horizontal stabilizers are
being manufactured by Alenia Aeronautica in Italy, and various parts of the fuselage sections
are being built by Alenia in Italy, Vought in Charleston, South Carolina, Kawasaki Heavy
Industries and Fuji Heavy Industries in Japan, Alenia in Italy and Spirit Aerosystems in
Wichita, Kansas. The main landing gear and nose landing gear are being supplied by the
French company Messier-Dowty, while passenger doors are being made by Latécoère in
France, and the cargo, access and crew escape doors by Saab in Sweden.23
WTO decision-makers in U.S. – Aircraft noted that as a result of globalized manufacturing Boeing has “shifted
responsibility for detailed component design to suppliers, and focuses on systems integration, managing
overall requirements, as well as the assembly process. The 787 is essentially assembled from large
substructures designed and produced by suppliers.”24
The description infers that what has arisen between Boeing and its suppliers is an elaborate network of
relationships that is responsible for creating a sophisticated final product made out of components from many
sources. Much modern manufacturing is in fact often characterized by these relationships. They value
coordination and integration so that manufacturing and delivery of the product becomes, in some sense,
unified.
Unification places its own demands on participants in the supply chain. Participants need to consider matters
differently. They must develop shared understandings about individual and common goods and must agree on
the allocation of rights and obligations between participants, often at great levels of detail. This is because
increased interdependence requires increased coordination.
The experience of Boeing and many other companies in the global economy demonstrates the way that
interdependence modifies thinking, a modification ultimately reflected in the shape of the law. Philip Allott has
explained how the transformation generated by international law is chiefly a mental, as opposed to a material,
process:
To change our idea of the world, to speak of the world in a new way, is to change what our
world will become. The road from the ideal to the actual lies, not merely in institutional
novelties, or programmes and blueprints for social change, but also, and primarily, in a
change of mind.25
Perhaps the most graphic manifestation of this demand for a change in thinking is panel and Appellate Body
criticism in situations where governments have failed to consider the interests of other member countries. For
example, in U.S. – Gasoline, the Appellate Body observed that while the introduction of baseline emission
requirements for ‘clean’ gasoline was considered unfeasible in the domestic context, there was “nothing in the
record to indicate that [the U.S.] did other than disregard that kind of consideration when it came to foreign
refiners.” It concluded that “[t]he resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely
inadvertent or unavoidable.”26 Similarly in U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, the panel noted that “[i]t seems to us that
the effect of banning cigarettes with characterizing flavours other than menthol is to impose costs on producers
in other Members, notably producers in Indonesia, while at the same time imposing no costs on any U.S.

United States – Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/R, Appendix VII.F.1, para. 25 (31 March 2011).
Ibid., para. 24. Former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy described a similar phenomenon in the global textiles value chain. The chain spans
countries involved in the “mere assembly” of imported fabric for export (such as China, Romania and Vietnam); to “original equipment
manufacture” where apparel products are manufactured in full, going beyond mere assembly (such as in Turkey); to “original design
manufacture” where in addition to full product manufacture a country can create ready-made collections at different levels of sophistication (such
as in Turkey and Hong Kong); and all the way to “original brand manufacture” where a country becomes the buyer in the value chain and starts to
manage the supply network (such as in the U.S. and Italy). See “What Cannot Be Counted Does Not Count” (speech by WTO Director-General
Pascal Lamy to the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Istanbul, 14
Mar. 2013).
25
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entity.”27 This criticism can be understood as evidence of the gradual emergence of the idea of a “common
good” under WTO law, itself reflective of a developing sense of community. The criticisms can be understood
as an exhortation upon governments to consider more than their own narrow interests.28
At the same time, with the specialization of function that interdependence allows, governments and countries
are also much more careful to define their allocation of rights and obligations. Each participant is more likely
to fulfill specific tasks and the degree of refinement must be reflected in legal arrangements, including the
definition of WTO law.29
So descriptions of interdependence are abundant in WTO case law, yet direct recognition of economic
interdependence and the way that it shapes legal rules are rare.30 The Preamble of the WTO Agreement
mentions, for instance, “expanding the production of and trade in goods and services” and “entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” as basic aims of the treaty, but again, these references are
generalized and appear not to contemplate the multi-dimensional, tentacular way that modern manufacturing
and service supply has evolved since the WTO Agreement was concluded in 1994. Thus, the multinational
nature of many supply and value chains coexists uneasily with a state-based system of international trade
governance.
For instance, there are a number of WTO provisions that presuppose the interdependence of producers and
consumers in supply chains. Article 3.1 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement provides, for instance, that:
A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent
authorities … This investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested
parties and public hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and
other interested parties could present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to
respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether
or not the application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest.
The safeguard provision thus requires an “investigation”, with notice to “importers, exporters and other
interested parties” and an assessment of whether the proposed safeguard would be in the broad “public
interest”. What the provision foresees is an assessment of competing needs for the import, including the needs
of competitors, consumers and downstream users of the product as an input. Likewise, in Arts 6.11-12 of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement and Art. 19.2 of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement
national authorities contemplating trade action are encouraged to give consideration to up- and downstream
27

WT/DS406/R, para. 7.289 (2 Sept. 2011).
Indeed, as part of WTO arrangements they are now in many instances required to do so. For instance, TBT Art. 2.9 includes obligations
requiring notification and comment in national standard-setting whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the technical content
of a proposed technical regulation is not in accordance with the technical content of relevant international standards.and the international and
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention …”. Likewise, SPS Art. 3.4 provides that
“Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in
particular the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, , to promote within these organizations the development
and periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.”
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This is particularly evident, for instance, in instruments of international commercial law such as the International Chamber of Commerce’s
International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) which were first introduced in 1936 but which, in their latest version introduced in 2010, now
require a specific address for delivery.
30
For additional recognition of supply chain relationships in WTO case law see Canada – Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para. 10.254 (11
Feb. 2000) (referring to “vertical integration and exclusive distribution arrangements between manufacturers and wholesalers in the motor vehicle
industry”); EC – Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB, para. 6.12 (9 April 1999) (refusing to acknowledge “losses of US exports in goods or services
between the US and third countries … [as] constitute[ing] nullification or impairment of even indirect benefits accruing to the United States
under the GATT or the GATS for which the European Communities could face suspension of concessions. To the extent the US assessment of
nullification or impairment includes lost US exports defined as US content incorporated in Latin American bananas (e.g. US fertilizer, pesticides
and machinery shipped to Latin America and US capital or management services used in banana cultivation), we do not consider such lost US
exports …” [emphasis in original]); EC – Sugar (Australia), WT/DS265/AB/R, para. 279 (28 April 2005) (observing that “that economic effects
of WTO-consistent domestic support may “spill over” to benefit export production. Such spill-over effects may arise, in particular, in
circumstances where agricultural products result from a single line of production that does not distinguish between production destined for the
domestic market and production destined for the export market.”); Mexico – Olive Oil, WT/DS341/R, para. 7.202 (4 Sept. 2008); Mexico –
Telecoms, WT/DS204/R, para. 7.40 (2 April 2004); U.S. – Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB/2, para. 5.149 (31 Aug. 2009) (noting that “it may be
especially difficult to have recourse to alternative suppliers [for the purposes of retaliation] without significantly upsetting the supply chain.”).
28
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interests that might be affected by anti-dumping or countervailing measures. In this sense WTO law is not
purely product-oriented. In the realm of trade restrictions, in particular, it aims to take account of the wider
interests potentially in issue due to economic linkage.
Interdependence is also a noticeable feature of WTO dispute settlement where, despite a superficially
‘bilateral’ aspect to disputes, rules have evolved to accommodate relatively liberal rights of participation for
third parties. For instance, DSU Art. 10.1 provides:
The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under a covered
agreement at issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process. 31
Commenting on these rules the panel in Australia – Apples noted that “not only have third parties the right to
make submissions in a dispute, but panels have the legal obligation to consider them.”32 Again, this is different
from other international legal systems like the International Court of Justice, international investment
arbitration or international criminal law, where bilateral emphasis in litigation is much more pronounced.33
This characteristic speaks to the multipolarity of many WTO disputes and the way that the definition of WTO
law is part of a broader common endeavour.34
Still, references recognizing the express connection between legal and substantive interdependence are
comparatively rare. One reference occurred in EC - Bananas III, a dispute involving a large number of Latin
American, Caribbean, African and Asian suppliers of bananas to the EC market. Complainants included the
United States, a negligible exporter of bananas. Arbitrators therefore had to contend with the EC assertion that
the U.S. lacked a exporter interest and could not seek to retaliate. In dismissing the EC’s objection the
arbitrators observed:
Indeed, with the increased interdependence of the global economy, which means that actions
taken in one country are likely to have significant effects on trade and foreign direct
investment flows in others, Members have a greater stake in enforcing WTO rules than in the
past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of rights and obligations is more likely
than ever to affect them, directly or indirectly. Since the United States is likely to be affected
by the EC regime, it would have an interest in a determination of whether the EC regime is
inconsistent with the requirements of WTO rules. Thus, in our view a Member's potential
interest in trade in goods or services and its interest in a determination of rights and
obligations under the WTO Agreement are each sufficient to establish a right to pursue a
WTO dispute settlement proceeding.35
The reluctance to refer more directly to interdependence may stem from a pragmatic appraisal that the concept
31

Emphasis added.
Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Applies from New Zealand, WT/DS367/R, para. 7.76 (9 Aug. 2010) [emphasis added]. See
also U.S. – Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 101 (12 Oct. 1998). For the difficulties of doing so see Canada – Wheat, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.6ff (6
Apr. 2004). For instances where panels have actively considered third party submissions, in some cases even preferring them to submissions by
the parties see EC – Bed Linen, WT/DS141/AB/R para. 142-144 (8 Apr. 2003), U.S. – Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para. 7.443 (8 Sept. 2004), United
States – Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW, para. 98, 112 (15 Aug. 2006); U.S. –Aircraft, WT/DS353/R para. 7.767 (31 Mar.
2011). Panels have often noted that WTO dispute settlement has consequences for third parties. Third parties also play an important role in
surveillance, monitoring and general ‘fine-tuning’ of rights and obligations raised in dispute settlement. See, for instance, submissions by the EC
in Canada – Aircraft (21.5), WT/DS70/AB/RW, para. 19 (21 July 2000). At the same time, the potential number of third parties in any dispute
appears to have resulted in a slight tightening of requirements for third party standing as compared with dispute settlement under GATT,
particularly in cases where ‘enhanced’ standing is requested: see United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS162/R, para. 6.33 (29 Mar.
2000); EC – Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, para. 7.166 (30 June 2010); U.S. – Aircraft, WT/DS353/R, para. 7.16 (31 Mar. 2011); EC – Bananas,
WT/DS/ARB, para. 2.8 (9 Sept. 1999) (re third parties in compliance proceedings).
33
See Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (1994). More recently some commentators have detected a slight relaxation in the
ICJ’s traditionally restrictive interpretation of requests to intervene under ICJ Statute Arts. 62-63. See Paolo Palchetti, “Opening the International
Court of Justice to Third States”, 6 Max Planck U.N.Y.B. 139 (2002).
34
Cases involving large numbers of third parties are numerous, including EC – Sugar (25 third parties), EC – Bananas (20 third parties), U.S. –
Zeroing, (WT/DS294 - 11 third parties), U.S. – Cotton (13 third parties), U.S. – Section 301 (17 third parties), China – Raw Materials
(WT/DS394 - 16 third parties).
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EC – Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.50 (22 May 1997).
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of interconnection can only be taken so far. Taken to extremes, anything can be linked to anything, emptying
the concept of meaningful content.
Thus, whereas interdependence is evident in certain aspects of WTO law, there are limits to its recognition. As
a result, WTO law can appear curiously double-aspected. For instance, while WTO law contains a relatively
expansive definition of who can participate in a safeguard hearing, as outlined above, the initiation of a
safeguard complaint is restricted to members of a defined “industry”. Several GATT and WTO decisions have
also made clear that, despite the integrated nature of many production processes, the term “industry” is to be
interpreted restrictively, consistent with the character of safeguards as an exceptional countermeasure to “fair”
trade. The right of initiation is limited to producers of the product, not those involved in the process by which
a product is made.36
A second area where interdependence is problematic is with respect to “pass-through” analysis in
countervailing action. Here, the issue that arises is whether or not subsidies received by an input producer or
product may be assessed for the purposes of countervailing action against downstream products. Several
GATT and WTO panels have considered a variety of circumstances involving the potential for pass-through
determinations.37 To date, the GATT/WTO jurisprudence has established that for an indirect input subsidy to
be countervailed, the investigating authority needs to conduct a pass-through test.38 The main principle is that
the national authority is not allowed to base its findings on a mere presumption of subsidy transmission from
an input producer to a producer of the processed product if they operate at arm’s length from each other.
Proposals made in the Doha Development Round generally reflect and develop this principle further.
Codification of the pass-through principle would bring more clarity and consistency to this area given the
potential ‘shadow’ that a subsidy presents for the remainder of the production chain.
Still another area where interdependence is problematic is in the retaliation phase of WTO dispute settlement.
Arbitrators and commentators have voiced concern about the difficulties that retaliation poses for secondary or
downstream users of products which may be targeted as part of selective market closure. Their inclusion within
supply chains makes the authorization to retaliate of questionable value. In EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) (Art.
22.6 – EC), for instance, the arbitrator examining Ecuador’s request to retaliate in a non-correspondent sector
against EC restrictions on Ecuadorian banana exports observed that Ecuador was a developing country with
little industrial infrastructure and, consequently, the suspension of concessions in relation to capital,
intermediate or other input goods, which constitute direct inputs into domestic production, has the potential to
be damaging to Ecuadorian economic operators. As a result, the arbitrator referred to the possibility of
retaliation in the field of services and intellectual property.39
Likewise, in U.S. – Cotton, a dispute involving claims by Brazil that the U.S. continued to subsidize U.S.
agricultural producers beyond limits permitted under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the arbitrator
assessing Brazil’s proposal to retaliate in non-correspondent sectors had to determine whether the proposal was
“practicable or effective” as required under DSU Art. 23:3. The prevalence of vertical integration meant that
one consideration the arbitrators had to take into account was whether it would be especially difficult to have
recourse to alternative suppliers without significantly upsetting the supply chain. The arbitrators concluded
that:
While there is no exact mathematical precision to this determination, we consider that, for the
purposes of our assessment in these proceedings, a US share of imports of 20 per cent
Thus, in U.S. – Lamb for instance, the panel noted that “the factor of economic interdependence between producers of raw, intermediate and
final products is not relevant for the industry definition.” The panel also observed the difficulty of quantifying interdependence for the purposes
of defining which economic operators could be part of an “industry”. See U.S. – Lamb, WT/DS177/R, para. 7.83 (21 Dec. 2000); see also U.S. –
Lamb, WT/DS177/AB/R, para. 94 (1 May 2001). For GATT decisions see United States – Definition of Industry Concerning Wine and Grape
Products, SCM/71, B.I.S.D. 39S/436 (adopted by the SCM Committee on 28 April 1992); Canada – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Imports of Manufacturing Beef from the EEC, SCM/85 (13 Oct. 1987) (not adopted).
37
See for instance US – Lead and Bismuth II, WT/DS138; US – Certain EC Products, WT/DS212.
38
Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, “How to Pass a Pass-Through Test: The Case of Input Subsidies” 15:2 J.I.E.L. 621 (2012).
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EC – Bananas (22.6 – Ecuador), WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 173 (24 March 2000).
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constitutes a reasonable threshold by which to estimate the extent to which Brazil may be able
to find alternative sources of supply for these three remaining categories of consumer goods
imports.40
These determinations mean that the multi-dimensional quality of interdependence as a concept makes it hard to
accommodate within the framework of WTO law. Everything cannot be related to everything else, and yet, in
some sense, it is.
4. Made in the World
The many references above suggest that no clear picture of interdependence has emerged in WTO law yet. It is
a polarizing subject, one which tugs in different directions, although more recently there are some indications
that it is being accorded attention in WTO thinking. In 2010 the WTO Secretariat launched a “Made in the
World Initiative” to provide a better evaluation of international trade to an economy and to highlight economic
interdependence, the contribution of services to trade and improved assessments of “value added”. MIWI’s
kick-off crystallized in the form of a report, Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia, issued in
2010 and co-sponsored by Institute of Developing Economies, an arm of the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO), and the WTO Secretariat.41
The central premise of MIWI and the Trade Patterns report is that national borders do not matter as much as
they once did. The report observed “that much of [international] trade these days comprises components or
intermediate goods and services that pass from economy to economy before becoming part of a final traded
product.” The report noted that:
The distinction between “them” and “us” that has traditionally defined our way of thinking
about imports and exports is increasingly outmoded. Products are no longer “made in Japan”,
or “made in France”; they are truly “made in the world”.42
According to the report this reformulation “redefines the nature of trade relations that are now characterized by
a much closer inter-relationship.” Consequently, the report maintains that “we need to promote a conceptual
and statistical shift in the way trade is most commonly perceived in policy debates.”
Using the experience of the “Asian success story”, Trade Patterns highlights the way that “increasing
fragmentation of value chains has led to an increase in trade flows in intermediate goods.”43 Consequently,
“[s]pecialization is no longer based on the overall balance of comparative advantage of countries in producing
a final good, but on the comparative advantage of “tasks” that these countries complete at a specific step along
the global value chain.” Trade Patterns notes the profile of countries that have achieved success by integrating
into supply- and value-chain manufacturing. It includes low tariffs on semi-processed goods, good logistics,
upgraded infrastructure, and foreign direct investment as an essential part of the offshoring strategies of
multinational companies.
The report reveals “a dialectical relationship characterized by significant structural diversity on the one hand
and a high degree of complementarity on the other one.”44 This complementarity of production “is both a cause
and an outcome of deepening economic interdependency among countries.” The report outlines the following
consequence:
Global value chains translate into “trade in tasks”, with partners specializing in specific skills
according to their comparative advantage. This creates new trade and job opportunities, the
U.S. – Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB/2, para. 5.181 (31 Aug. 2009).
See IDE-JETRO, Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia (2010) [hereinafter Trade Patterns].
42
Trade Patterns, p. 3.
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Ibid., p. 4.
44
Ibid., p. 5.
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net balance of which depends on the labour intensity of the products and the overall trade
balance of each economy.45
Trade Patterns does a good job of providing an introduction to the phenomenon of interdependence, but the
report also emphasizes how interdependence challenges the WTO’s existing regulatory structure. Since the
report’s release the organization has struggled to accommodate this phenomenon and appears to be unsure of
its place in a state-centric system.
The MIWI agenda is an uncertain one of symposia and studies, but as yet, little in the way of specific policy
prescriptions for the organization itself. At the moment most of its focus is statistical and empiric rather than
normative. If interdependence is now so pervasive and if it challenges the state-centered model of “rights and
obligations”, what is the solution? The Secretariat provides no immediate answer to this question, and indeed,
there may be none. Instead, in introducing the IDE-JETRO report the then-WTO Director General Pascal
Lamy called upon the global public to “pursue the dialogue virtually” through a website.
It is also easy to be a little suspicious of MIWI. It rose to prominence after a keynote speech by one of the
WTO deputy director generals, Alejandro Jara, in May 2010. MIWI can be seen to fulfil an ambition of
developing countries, some of which want to promote more of a development dimension in the WTO and
hence stress the idea of “trade in tasks”.46 As such, it may be regarded as a sop. Since the accession of the new
WTO Director-General, Roberto Azevedo, in May 2013, institutional attention to MIWI has fallen off, at least
if indications on the WTO website are to be taken at face value. The section of the site devoted specifically to
MIWI has only been minimally updated.
5. Conclusion
A comprehensive idea of WTO law suggests that greater interdependence is the ultimate product of WTO
concessions and commitments. However, the sheer inability to grapple with and ‘de-construct’
interdependence, to fix and put a number to it, may be an indication of its “oneness”, its centrality and
fundamentality. The behaviour of countries in the resolution of several WTO-related matters suggests that they
intuit this point, something that may presage a greater role for qualitative as opposed to quantitative measures
of trade benefit in future.47
All of the above, however, does not obscure the fact that interdependence is not a neutral value, not
unreservedly positive. The reference to “chains” in supply- and value-chains can be understood as a
contemporary form of bondage.48 Feminism, in particular, has done much in the past century to unmask the
matrices of power in traditional relationships that result in subordination. Critical legal scholars such as Martti
Koskenniemi have also condemned interdependence as simply another justification for communitarian
thinking - thinking that is but one part of a flawed “international legal project”.49 These reservations suggest
45

Ibid.
Behind the re-characterization is the more general idea that there should be a focus on “equitable and efficient dispersal” of the three factors of
production – capital, knowledge, and labor. Existing trade statistics are therefore, at most, incidental. This opinion is part of a broader set of
convictions that past trade talks have consistently delivered unbalanced trade deals favoring the richer industrial states over their poorer, less able
developing counterparts as well as a fear that ongoing negotiations over a “Trans-Pacific Partnership” are a U.S.-led attempt to divide the Asia
region and contain the rise of China.
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A number of commentators have written of the difficulty of deepening transnational integration when quantification is problematic. For an
overview see Geza Feketekuty, “Appendix: A Guide to Services Negotiations” in Aaditya Mattoo et al., A Handbook of International Trade in
Services (“The shortcomings of the trade data are compounded by the difficulty of making a quantitative assessment of the degree of protection
provided by regulatory measures. It is much easier to calculate the protection provided by a tariff or a quota than the protection provided by a
regulatory measure. Negotiators in services thus lack the kind of detailed data that would enable them to estimate the impact of negotiated
reductions in particular barriers …” p. 553).
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Stewart Macaulay has written about the negative effects of interdependence: “Even discrete transactions take place within a setting of
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only take orders.” Stewart Macaulay, “An Empirical View of Contract” Wis. L. Rev. 465 (1985).
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Koskenniemi’s principal argument is “[e]ach general principle [of international law] seems capable of being opposed with an equally valid
counterprinciple” (p. 3), a recurrent development that “reproduces the paradoxes and ambivalences of a liberal theory of politics” (p. xliii) and
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that interdependence needs to be constantly be questioned and re-evaluated going forward.

that, consequently, any appeal to theory “merely reproduces the conflicts at a higher level of abstraction.” (p. 3) He goes on to observe, “[i]f
international law is indeterminate, then there is no limit to the extent that it can be used to justify … existing practices.” (Ibid., pp. 614-615)
Koskenniemi describes communitarian thinking as emerging in three standard forms: a Grotian tradition, interdependence, or the appeal to a
conscience universelle. He criticizes interdependence as a trope, or form of argument, based on the premise that “Humanity today, taking into
consideration the whole world, knows that ‘one world’ has become the imperative of survival.” In Koskenniemi’s view these sorts of arguments
“start[] from a negative experience of autonomy as egoism and proceeds so as to compel normative order by referring to norms “naturally” given
by the needs of interdependence.” See Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia 477 (2005). My objections to Koskenniemi, based on the
theory put forward in this book, are that WTO law is premised on an idea of justice that prioritizes equality over fairness (i.e. equality > fairness),
and therefore, any general principle is not automatically capable of being opposed by an “equally valid counterprinciple”. With respect to
interdependence, I maintain that interdependence needs to be understood not simply as an argument, but as a fact. For examination of
interdependence as less than it might be see the DHL Global Connectedness Index and “Going Backwards” 405:8816 The Economist 105 (22
Dec. 2012).

